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ABSTRACT 
The efficiency analysis literature has long acknowledged the difference between program/policy effects 
and relative efficiency effects.  The use of incentive compatible policy has been an important research 
agenda for fisheries economists, and Canada uses an array of policies and regulatory tools to fulfill the 
objectives of their Fisheries Act.  One important policy change, beginning in the 90s was aimed at having 
a more equitable distribution of Aboriginal access to various fisheries.  In Canada, these policies came in 
the wake of two Supreme Court decisions, which aimed to expand the involvement of aboriginal groups 
in marine fisheries.  We use available data provided by Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) to examine 
localized effects of various programs of the Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy on the performance of fleets on 
the North Shore of the St. Lawrence Estuary.  While there has been a steady growth of the Aboriginal 
share of the fishery over time, a closer examination reveals that there may still be important differences in 
technical  efficiency  between  Aboriginal  and  Non-Aboriginal  (NA)  operating  units,  despite  important 
investments in education and other infrastructure.  Part of these differences may be due to differences in 
industrial organization, a relative lack of skilled labor among Aboriginals, and Canadian fisheries policies 
themselves.  In certain cases, license transfer policies to Aboriginals may have led to losses in productive 
efficiency.  In other cases license transfers may have resulted in Aboriginal groups simply hiring back 
displaced non-Aboriginal workers.  The implications of these results are discussed.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The firm, as well as other decision-makers in an economy, can be affected not only by the internal rules 
of the firm, but also by the policies under which they work.  However, the organization of production, 
sometimes formed over years or even decades of practice, may not be easily overturned or changed by 
policy.  The flexibility of firms' operational methods depends, in part, on the ability of decision-making 
units to adapt their own practices to new policies.  These behaviors may not be as malleable to change as 
might  be  supposed  and  may  be  seen  as  a  source  of  inefficiency  with  respect  to  new  policies.  
Unresponsive  behavior  may  result  in  no  change  at  all  because  the  firms  or  decision-making  units 
circumvent  the  problem  by  other  means.   Alternatively,  it  could result  in  a demonstrable decline  in 
technical or allocative efficiency among those who try to adapt by other means.   
 
This paper describes an important case study for Canada.  In the wake of two Supreme Court decisions
b 
aimed at addressing governmental injustices to Canadian Aboriginals, the Government of Canada through 
the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), decided to implement a program  aimed at re-integrating 
Aboriginal communities into existing marine fisheries.  The polic y, which became known as the 
Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy, became a broad program of technical support, education, and importantly, 
the  transfer  of fishing licenses from non -Aboriginal (NA) fishers to A boriginal recipients through a 
system of  voluntary buybacks and transfers.  This system involved government purchase s of licenses 
from NA, so that these licenses with the boat and all equipment could be given to aboriginal fishers.  The 
impact of this buyback-transfer system on the fishing fleet in general,  and on the aboriginal fleet in 
particular, as well as adjustments that occurred, places into perspective a difficulty with standard analyses IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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of overcapacity and overcapitalization in the fishery; the measures are susceptible to policy changes as 
well as to the malleability of decision-making units.  These phenomena may lead to behavioral responses 
that are surprising not only to the firms, but also to the regulatory agency, in this case DFO, which is 
charged with effecting the change.   
 
 
THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND THE LICENCE TRANSFER PROGRAMS 
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed the 1760 and 1761 treaties of "Peace and Friendship" 
between the British Crown and the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet First Nations in the case of R. v. Marshall and 
clarified certain points of the previous Sparrow ruling of 1990.  As a result, these First Nations peoples 
retained the right to hunt, fish, and engage in harvest activities and to trade for "necessary" goods.  The 
Court  concluded  that  in  today's  terms,  "the  acquisition  of  necessary  goods"  is  the  equivalent  of  a 
"moderate livelihood".  This includes essentials like food, clothing and housing, supplemented by a few 
amenities.  However, it does not extend to the accumulation of wealth.  The Court concluded that to 
exercise this right and to do business in a meaningful way, the beneficiaries of the Treaty had an implied 
right to hunt, fish and gather, and to do this in order to obtain goods for trade.  Through this ruling, the 
Court confirmed the authority of the federal government to address treaty rights and limited those rights 
to traditional sectors used by the affected community.  As such, fishing licenses could be transferred to a 
collective of individuals, such as a First Nations Band Council, rather than to individual aboriginals.   
 
The Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy (AFS) programs, started in 1992, developed as a consequence of the 
Sparrow and Marshall decisions.  While the Sparrow decision called for a more equitable division of 
fishing privileges to indigenous peoples for food, social and ceremonial purposes, the Marshall decision 
called for broadening the definition of subsistence to include commercial fishing.  This broadening of the 
subsistence definition has ultimately given aboriginals access to fisheries resources through a series of 
acquisitions and transfers or through sales using government guaranteed loans.  
 
DFO's policies following the Sparrow and Marshall decisions had the following objectives: 
1. Provide a regulatory framework for the management of aboriginal fishing for food, social or 
ceremonial purposes; 
2. Offer the possibility of aboriginal participation in fisheries management, which will have a 
positive effect on the conservation, management and enhancement of the resource; 
3. Promote economic independence for aboriginal communities; 
4. Provide a solid foundation for the conclusion of treaties and agreements on self-government; 
5. Improve skills and capabilities of indigenous groups. 
 
The mechanisms of this strategy are diverse and consist of incentives, training and financing business 
activities  in  aboriginal  communities.    These  objectives  are  aimed  at  ensuring  effective  management 
through Comprehensive Fisheries Agreements made between the Canadian government and Aboriginal 
groups.  To do this, DFO maintains negotiations and attempts to achieve mutually acceptable limited term 
agreements with aboriginal groups.  In cases where the parties failed to agree, DFO reviewed previous 
consultations with aboriginal groups and maintained their fishing rights for subsistence.  However, in the 
case of an agreement, DFO would award the group commercial fishing permits as part of the agreement.  
This agreement may contain information on allowed tonnage and on the joint management of fishing for 
food, social and ceremonial purposes by aboriginal communities.  The communal fishing license may 
have  set  conditions,  such as the  allowed  tonnage,  defined  fishing  areas,  the  gear  to be  used and its 
dimensions, size regulations regarding the catch and access to data collection. 
 
The AFS program was developed because of perceived inequities in the allocation of fishing privileges 
between aboriginals and NAs.  However, some of these inequities may be because of differences between 
the structure of governance among indigenous groups in Canada and the broader economy.  Aboriginal IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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society is organized around the concept of band councils and tribes.  Private property, although present, is 
less common; collective ownership of enterprises is more prevalent.   
 
Agreements negotiated under the AFS are summarized in the Comprehensive Fishing Agreements (CFA), 
which  are  among  the  first  co-management  arrangements  between  DFO  and  private  entities.    These 
agreements  include  stock  assessment  tasks,  enhancement,  management  of  fisheries  and  habitat 
management projects.  Communal licenses provide opportunities for aboriginal communities to fish for 
food, social and ceremonial purposes.  These licenses incorporate the management of aboriginal fishing 
and the public management of fisheries in a wider context. 
 
The Allocation Transfer Program (ATP) was added to the AFS in 1994 as a means of encouraging self-
sufficiency within communities through participation in commercial fishing.  The ATP was based on the 
voluntary retirement of NA fishers' commercial licenses through buybacks, which were then issued as 
new licenses to aboriginal organizations.  One issue in this analysis is the impact of remittances on the 
level of effective effort in the fishery and the division of profits between aboriginals and NAs as a result 
of these transfers.   
 
Depending on the priorities and capacities of local aboriginal groups, program funding also allowed them 
to obtain full-time professional services such as a fisheries coordinator, manager, biologist or technician 
and administrative staff.  Funds were available to cover the cost of office rental and buying computers, as 
well as expenses related to coordination.  The program is thus designed to support the creation of new 
organizations or to consolidate existing programs.  DFO policy on Aboriginal fishing in Canada has 
developed since the Sparrow decision.  Following this decision, a policy and regulatory structure was 
implemented  by  DFO  that  enabled  co-management  process  of  a  variety  of  activities  ranging  from 
subsistence  to  commercial  fishing.    The  subsequent  Marshall  decision  was  another  step  towards 
increasing aboriginal participation in commercial fishing.  DFO policy in response to these decisions has 
been mainly oriented towards increasing productive efficiency of aboriginal groups, while at the same 
time maintaining the condition that licenses that were transferred be held in common.  
 
 
LOCALIZED EVIDENCE ON THE PROGRAMS  
The study area is the North Shore of Québec, and more specifically the Innu tribes of the area from 
roughly Essipit out to the frontier with Labrador (Figure 1).   
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Map of Quebec and detail of the North Shore (Source: Quebec North Shore Outfitters; 
Pickatrail.com.)  IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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As an indication of the size of the investments per year, the last available information on AFS in 2005-
2006 for Québec had the total budget at 3.373M $, 2.476M $ of which was the Aboriginal Transfer 
Program, which was the program which transferred licenses from NAs to Aboriginals.  Keeping these 
figures in mind, we found data compiled by DFO which shows the evolution of the catch statistics for 
selected fisheries on the North Shore and Quebec from 2000-2009 (Figure 2).   
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Evolution from 2000 to 2009 of aboriginal landings, total North Coast landings, and Quebec 
landings.  (Source:  DFO)  
 
This series shows that, while the overall productivity of the North Shore has held relatively steady except 
for declines in 2003-2005, the share of Aboriginal activity has risen from about 2% of the North Coast 
landings  in  2000,  to  about  18%  in  2009.    This  might  be  taken  as  an  indication  that  the  AFS,  and 
particularly the ATP program, has on the whole been successful.   
 
However, when we look more closely at some comparative performance indicators in the Aboriginal fleet, 
the story becomes more complex.  
 
 
PROGRAM CHANGES AND COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS 
We studied more detailed data from DFO, in an effort to understand what was behind the broad results.  
One set of summary data shows aggregated costs and earnings statistics of different fisheries in Zone 16 
on the North Coast.  Different production indices through time, organized by whether or not the vessels 
are Aboriginal-owned, are included in the data.  We also reviewed discussion documents of DFO 
analysts, in the wake of their refusal of a season extension for the 2010 season made by Aboriginal 
fishing firms.  The reasons for this discussion and analysis were that certain fishers of high valued species 
such as snow crab were finding it difficult to exploit their individual quota over the season set by DFO.  
Those fishers made a request to extend the fishing season to provide more flexibility.  These are the first 
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indications that there were effectively variations in productive capacity and technical efficiency between 
the respective fleets.    
 
However, when analyzing the comparative performance of Aboriginal and NA operators, it is important 
to keep several ideas in mind.  First, the organizational structure of Aboriginal producers in the fishing 
fleet is different from the organizational structure of NA producers, especially under an ITQ or IQ system.  
Permits are collectively held in the Aboriginal context, whereas they are privately held in NA contexts.  
This difference may have an effect on the distribution of costs and earnings of actual operations, as well 
as on organizational costs.  There are many examples of community quotas throughout the world (Ginter, 
1997 ;  Langdon 2008), and the relative merits of Community based approaches compared to ITQ policy 
has been explored as well (Copes and Charles,  2004).  The arguments of those who study community 
management use important concepts in institutional economics such as the "Optimal commons" (Field 
1985).  This idea argues that the relative efficiency of certain types of decision-making structures depends 
critically upon the internal organization costs of the unit compared to the organizational costs external to 
the unit, in comparison to the likely benefits to be derived from organizations of different size.  The point 
of these arguments is that "one size does not fit all" when it comes to fisheries policy.  Community based 
management using community licenses may be, under certain circumstances, "optimal".  However, this 
does not mean that the costs and benefits and therefore the relative efficiencies, are directly comparable to 
the case of the private competitive firm, as though that case is the standard.  
 
Second, the existence of a program managed by DFO, aimed at Aboriginal groups, may have both 
positive as well as negative effects on performance indices.  While skill levels have appeared to improve 
for some workers, and access to capital is better assured, there may be negative effects on productivity 
brought on by the economic effects of subsidies.  The most direct example is that we know that various 
subsidy programs tend to raise the opportunity costs of Aboriginal workers, which may result in high 
turnover and unemployment.  Part of the AFS subsidies aimed at growing the Aboriginal part of the 
sector may be dissipated through countervailing subsidies.   
 
A third issue is related to the effects of permit transfers.  The way in which a permit is used or not used 
may be related to the way in which the permit was acquired.  If the owner of an asset (a permit) does not 
acquire it with scarce resources, the use of that asset may not be efficient.  The owner may not be aware 
of the true value of the asset, or alternatively, he may not have the skills to use the asset.  A third 
possibility may be that the terms defined by existing regulation, or constraints imposed by the market, 
may make it difficult or impossible to use the asset.  For example, permit transfers to Aboriginals are one 
way; they cannot be sold to a third party.  Permits and quotas are for specific zones and quantities which 
might not be useable because of distance or size of quota.    
 
All of these reasons, which may affect competitiveness, may be the reason for the statistically significant 
differences we see in indices of productivity between NAs and Aboriginals.  Table 1 presents the results 
of a series of simple statistical estimations of different productivity estimates.  Since this is based upon a 
small sample, we used a linear estimation with only two explanatory variables.  One is a trend line and the 
other is a binary variable where the intercept term is the effect of NA production.  The variable 
“Aboriginal” is a dummy variable that shifts the intercept value of the productivity index in question.   
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Table 1.  Results of regressions of three indexes of productivity (2006-2010) with a binary variable 
"Aboriginal" (* 90%;  ** 95%;  *** 99%).  
 
   Traps raised per boat  Soak time per boat  Landings per boat 
R
2  0.65428  0.5237  0.9023 
R
2 Adjusted  0.55551  0.3876  0.8744 
F (Sig)  6.624 (0.024)**  3.849 (0.075)*  32.3477(0.0003)*** 
Intercept  5987.75***  7401.437***  77912.15*** 
Aboriginal  -2610.25**  -2778.981**  -20542.81*** 
Trend  476.03  836.48  7541.98*** 
         
The three regressions of productivity indices we use is the number of traps raised by boat, the hours of 
trap immersion by boat, and catch by boat.  In these three estimations, the first and the last are the most 
significant, with F values and t statistics above the 95% level, even considering the small sample size.  
The overall trend in the indices is positive in all three estimates over time, which is to be expected given 
the evolution of real effort over time.  Capital investments, learning, and other improvements in 
operations will usually result in increasing marginal changes in these indices over time, even if natural 
stocks decline.  Productivity indices that reflect the productive factors of a real economy, especially 
different forms of capital and labor, environmental productivity, and natural capital, stand a greater 
chance of providing policy relevant information than do more simplistic notions of effort.  Catch per boat 
over the period covered showed a marginal increase per boat of about 7,500 kg per year.  However, it is 
also true that despite these increases, the marginal productivity per boat among Aboriginal producers is 
negative, and significant.  That is, NA vessels in this sample caught an average of 77,912 kg of crab in 
Zone 16, whereas Aboriginal vessels captured an average of 57,370 (77,912 - 20,542) kilograms.  Further, 
these estimates are statistically significant despite the low degrees of freedom.   
 
This may be evidence that permit and quota usage among Aboriginals is less intensive, at least in recent 
years, compared to NA firms.  This may have prompted some Aboriginals to request season extensions in 
Zone 16.  DFO resisted this request for two reasons.  First, it was felt that Aboriginal producers should 
simply fish “earlier and harder,” like NA fishers.  Second, they offered the argument that it was always 
good to leave some quota in the water for conserving the resource.   
 
Within the structure of the quota system, each vessel receives a part of the global quota established for the 
zone.  They therefore have the equivalent of an individual vessel quota that is tied directly to a TAC.  In 
these cases, and knowing that collective use of an asset might be relatively less productive, especially in 
the context where it is generally acknowledged that Aboriginal groups are learning, then it does seem 
reasonable in this case to allow for longer seasons.  The reason for individual quota management in the 
first place is to provide flexibility to producers while assuring that the resource will not be over-exploited.  
The benefits and costs of individual quotas have been extensively discussed in the fishery management 
literature
c, but the general consensus is that they can permit more flexibility among producers.  Among 
the benefits of longer seasons are:  reduced incidence of death and accidents of mariners; a more even 
product delivery to the dock throughout the season, thereby avoiding gluts, price declines and wastage;  
reduced at-sea mortality of incidental catch; higher quality of delivered product; and more efficient use of 
both human and physical capital (National Academy of Sciences, 1999).   
 
The reaction of DFO to the variability in productivity between Aboriginals and NAs is a demonstration of 
how difficult it can be for public managers to coherently accommodate producers that operate under 
different types of industrial organization, even when their own intuition and policies tells them that 
accommodation is necessary.  It may not be in the interests of DFO or the industry to advise Aboriginal 
fishers to try to increase the intensity of their fishing activity.  In addition, “leaving quota in the water for IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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the good of the resource” may not be compatible with the management structure in place or the economic 
incentives of producers.  If individual quotas are left in the water, the stock will indeed benefit, since part 
of the stock will help increase the populations in following years, but part of the stock will die of natural 
causes.  There is no guarantee that the contributor of left-over stock will ever benefit from this act, for 
many reasons.  In many systems involving individual quota management, the issue of season length 
becomes less important, because output is effectively constrained by the TAC and individual quota.   
 
The differences in productivity between Aboriginal and NAs will likely exist for some time.  However 
these differences are neither surprising nor are they particularly undesirable.  In addition, they are easily 
accommodated with an IQ or ITQ system.  They arise from different productive organizations with 
different objectives for the decision-making unit.  Some of these constraints are even legally mandated in 
Canada.  
 
 
EDUCATIONAL SUBSIDIES     
Under AFS, DFO has maintained an active, technical educational program for Aboriginals that is mainly 
at the post-secondary and junior college level
d.  In the Innu community 205 people have taken 1 or more 
courses from the inception of the SRAPA program up to 2009.  A high turnover rate occurs in fishing 
operations and in most sectors in the Aboriginal communities.  
   
The success rates for these courses are perhaps an indication that for those who do take them, mostly 
younger crew-members, they are motivated to complete courses, but they are not necessarily motivated to 
complete the entire program.  DFO pays for tuition and travel of those who stay in the courses.  They also 
provide subsidies for trainees during their coursework for up to two years, and some of these costs are 
shared with the Band administration.  However, no one has actually completed the entire professional 
program to date.  Some Band members feel that there is an over-production of technical jobs and some 
have confirmed that the turn-over among young people in the fishery tends to be high. 
 
Innu communities on the North Coast deal with seasonal unemployment, which presents problems for 
smaller communities.  Consequently, these communities hire NAs to fill positions.  In communities with a 
sufficient population and demonstrate an openness to hiring specialized labor that is NA, then filling 
management positions is less problematic.  However, employment related problems may also extend to 
the higher ranks of professional activities, like managers and boat captains.  This is partly due to the fact 
that many Aboriginals with higher education tend to be attracted by higher paying opportunities outside 
the community.  Perhaps because of this, there are indications that almost all Innu communities on the 
North Shore have a shortage of Aboriginal human resources at the professional levels.  In some 
communities, fisheries coordinators seemed unprepared to take on the management of fisheries 
operations.  This may partially explain why, for example, quota for even high-valued species such as 
snow crab might go unused in some communities.   
 
 
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 
Governance plays a role when analyzing the effectiveness of the AFS Program in different communities.  
Although all Innu communities have autonomous band councils, not all of the governance structures are 
similar and ownership patterns of different assets in the community vary greatly.  In some communities, 
economic activity is structured so that most businesses are community owned.  Sometimes, this model 
also extends to living quarters, where rent is paid to the band council.  Not surprisingly, common property 
problems (usually over-use of capital infrastructure) occur.  However, the fisheries related enterprises are 
communally held, as they must be by law.  This may explain differences in operational efficiency 
between Aboriginal and NA fisheries operations.  Communal management of fisheries activities might 
lead to vessels that are older than usual, with possibly not enough revenue set aside for maintenance and IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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replacement of capital stock.  This may lead to in-season break-downs which ultimately lead to under-use 
of quota.  
 
Management practices at DFO may affect the development of fisheries related activities.  Two examples 
warrant discussion.  In reviewing permit usage, it was found that some communities have a high rate of 
non-use or incomplete use of some permits of lower-valued species.  Interviews with one band 
administrator revealed that the market prices would not support their exploitation.  The recipients of these 
permits opted not to use them, because they felt that they would have operated at a loss.   As one fisheries 
coordinator said, some permits were offered as “gifts” that were ancillary to the allocation of a higher 
valued species, such as crab quota.  Some permits, like an ancillary herring permit given with a crab 
quota, seemed reasonable.  But when these opportunities were more thoroughly explored, it was found 
that regulatory restrictions on the transfer of permits and quotas (the collective permit to Aboriginals 
cannot be sold or permanently transferred to NAs), coupled with the fact that returns on exploitation of 
these permits may be modest, made it relatively difficult to benefit from the permits.  Some managers 
have opted to hold these permits until such time that they might become profitable.   
 
The need to do this may be in part related to the inflexibility of the quota and permit programs presently 
in place.  These restrictions make it difficult for anyone, even Aboriginal communities, to treat the permit 
as an exchangeable asset rather than as a privilege, in the sense of the Fisheries Act.  This is the case even 
though the customary practice, even at DFO, is to treat them in this way.  However, the ability to trade, 
allows market forces to take over part of the role of resource allocation.  This is thought by many fisheries 
management specialists to result in some efficiency gains.  Related to this is the second complaint:  some 
current quota regulations are unnecessarily restrictive.  These restrictions prevent operators from 
achieving appropriate economies of scale, because they cannot combine quotas from different 
communities fishing in the same region on one boat, nor can they fish later in the season.  
 
 
EFFECTS OF BUY-BACKS IN REMOTE AREAS 
Economists are generally unfriendly towards the use of subsidies, and cautious with regards to buy-backs.  
Those selling out of the fishery through a buy-back program, who know that the government has allocated 
funds for buying businesses, as happened in the ATP program, will bid up the prices of these businesses, 
usually beyond the price necessary to entice them out of the fishery.  In the case of some communities of 
the north Shore, sellers of a permit and boat were sometimes hired back as boat captains, with a crew that 
was subsidized.  The captain who was a former owner gains a windfall, but in the case of the North Shore, 
because the market for specialized labor is thin,  much of that labor may find its way back to the fishery 
anyway, under new ownership.  The issue of buybacks has been explored by Hannesson (2007), as well as 
others.  One lesson from these studies is that buyback programs are difficult to efficiently execute.  We 
expect that they would be especially difficult to do in thin labor markets like we see in Northern Québec.   
 
Transfers of ownership of licenses and boats may involve some loss of information on actual fishing 
practices and some loss of expertise, which have to be re-learned by those who have received licenses.  In 
the case of Quebec, this has been offset by public investment in training.  Although these programs have 
had some effect on the development of the fishing sector, this leads to questions about the way in which 
transfers are made.  A review of DFO data on indigenous designated masters and designated crew  (in 
terms of positions held) in 2011, reveals that Aboriginal boat captains in that year occupied 11% of 
positions whereas Aboriginal crew members occupied about 80% of positions on Aboriginal owned 
vessels.  These limited data suggest that the ATP programs, while transferring ownership of firms, did not 
necessarily lead to rapid changes in management of these firms.  However, the training programs aimed at 
deckhands does appear to have had a positive effect on the structure of Aboriginal employment, although 
the turn-over in these jobs is still high.  
 IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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Each year, as DFO obtains additional funds for ATP, a substantial amount is added to subsidize the 
purchase of fishing enterprises.  Over the last 4 years, DFO has gradually shifted towards contributing a 
portion of the costs of acquisition, generally 80-90%, with the band completing the purchase with their 
own money (Wilkins, Pers. Comm.).  In the future, this amount may be reduced.  Reducing dependency 
on subsidies is tending in the right direction, and may contribute to improvements in performance.    
 
 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The response of DFO to the Canadian Supreme Court decisions resulted in the institution of the AFS and 
the ATP programs.  Now after over a decade, it may be time to take stock and to ask what changes have 
occurred in the structure and function of the industry, and to ask what might be some recommendations 
for the future.   
 
We note a similar pattern to the transfer problem to Aboriginals recently cited in Australia by Pascoe 
(2012).  The opportunity costs of Aboriginals may be such that their implication in the fishery may be 
slowed.  There is a difference in the technical efficiency of firms, but this might be due to a number of 
things,  in particular, the fact that permits to Aboriginals are held communally whereas they are held 
privately among NA firms.  It also might be because of the effects of subsidies on firm behavior, and also 
public management rigidities.  Whatever the reasons, the image that we get is that the AFS and the 
transfer programs, in place since 1992 and 1994, seem to be having a relatively modest impact on the 
growth of Aboriginal involvement in the fishery, at least in the North Coast of Quebec.  Some of this 
growth might be due to the fact that some NA resources are hired back after transfers are made, but 
simply change who they work for.  Certainly some of the growth is due to subsidy effects and not due to 
gains in efficiency at all.  This can be guessed by looking at Figure 1.  In periods where the gains of the 
Aboriginal catches are the most pronounced, the declines in the total North Shore catches are even larger.  
 
What are some of the recommendations that could be made to improve the performance of the AFS?   
  
Awarding funds for the acquisition of new enterprises to band councils might be done competitively, 
based upon an independent evaluation of the business plans of band councils who wish to acquire new 
enterprises.  We believe also that there needs to be a tightening of the requirements that band councils 
make financial or in-kind contributions to the projects.   
 
DFO should eliminate subsidies for at sea training and instead, initiate a share system for new crew-
members, as on other vessels in the fleet.  The bands should be able to finance a crew, especially with 
higher value permits.  Usually, high turn-over is an indication that workers are not being paid their 
opportunity wage, i.e., the wage that compensates them sufficiently to make them stay.   
 
While helping the Aboriginal communities become part of the fishing industry is an important goal, 
placing them on a technical par with NAs may not be feasible or desirable, since differences in 
productivity may have little to do with structural factors that DFO can control through the allocation of 
funds and organizational activities.  However, some changes that would be useful might include:  
 
1. Further experiments with zonal management groups composed of Aboriginals and NAs with 
access to a zone, in order to address the year to year management issues such as catch overages or 
shortfalls, season length and capacity monitoring and management.  This may be possible using 
joint planning agreements.  In particular, one of the first activities of a zonal management group 
for Zone 16 would be to negotiate for a longer season length.  
 
2.  Review and adjust subsidy policies and programs towards a more cost-sharing approach, in 
order to reduce the negative effects of subsidies on productivity.  IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
  10 
 
Because the transfer of licenses under AFS was to communities and not to individuals, this has led to a 
renewed emphasis on collective governance structures, which may not be taken sufficiently into account 
in the management of the fishery by DFO.  Collective management or commons management is thought 
by many economists today to be no better or worse than complete privatization, and efficiency 
considerations should be made taking into account the relevant industrial organization that the public 
manager is facing.  However, when a fishery does have different industrial organizations, say, community 
quotas and privately held ITQs, then accommodations will need to be made.  Happily, ITQ policy 
generally is very flexible, and can accommodate different structures with some planning.  That in fact is 
the summary message of a number of authors who have studied the application of ITQ programs world-
wide (Shotton 2001a ; Shotton 2001b).     
 
There is little evidence that the management capacity of individual band organizations guided DFO in 
their decision to transfer permits and other assets, when one might expect this to possibly be a prime 
consideration when transferring an asset.  It is possible that the AFS program could transfer too many 
licenses for the management capabilities of a band council, forcing it to choose which permits to exploit, 
or placing some councils in a situation where they could not completely exploit a permit.  This realization 
might  argue  for  a  more  measured  and  market  based  approach  to  distributing  permits  and  also  to 
permit/quota use and transfer.  Permit and quotas cannot pass permanently into the hands of others, but 
maybe there are rule changes that can be made to make the temporary use of permits and quota shares of 
Aboriginals easier and less costly.  
 
The history of AFS suggests that fisheries managed collectively in collaboration with the band council 
can make public management more effective, because part of the management responsibility can be 
transferred to the concerned community through Comprehensive Fisheries Agreements.  This is an 
attractive extension of much of the literature of fisheries self-governance of which Townsend et al (2008) 
is an example.  However,  doing this in the context of the AFS may require more capacity building, but 
this time in the important areas of resource management,  public management, finance,  and law.  These 
considerations will likely give a new direction to the programs that are already in place.   
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
a Disclaimer:  The views expressed by the authors do not reflect the views of the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans or the Government of Canada. 
b R. v. Sparrow, 1990, which  found that  where an  Aboriginal  group  has a right to  fish for  food, social, and 
ceremonial purposes, it takes priority, after conservation, over all other uses of the fishery.  R. v. Marshall, 1999, 
affirmed a treaty right to  hunt, fish and gather in pursuit of a “moderate livelihood” arising out of Peace and 
Friendship Treaties of 1760 and 1761.  http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fm-gp/aboriginal-autochtones/marshall/afs-srapa-
eng.htm 
c This same document talks about catch overages by Aboriginals earlier in this series.  In the Canadian system, catch 
overages from one year are deducted from quota in the following year, or are subject to fines. 
d The EPAQ in Grande-Rivière and other course providers in CEGEPs for courses dealing with mechanical abilities 
are examples.  Completion of courses leads to a certification of aide-pêcheur profesionnel (deck-hand) or class IV 
master (capitain).  More information is available on http://www.epaq.qc.ca/index.php/peche 
 